Any USA Civil War History Buffs?

[YYZ66]

Yes that and McClellan was a twit. He had the Lost Orders in hand and waffled....badly. A more decisive commander like Grant would have slammed Lee at Antietam and it would have all been over in 1862, hypothetically.

 

A twit?   LOL

I guess the Union had quite a few twits, did they not?

The names escape me (been too long since I've read about them), but I know they pulled quite a number of blunders.

[MsMarvel73]

Listen here smart guy!!!  Why don't you come down to southcentral PA during the nasty months of summer, and deal with this humidity in a complete wool outfit!!   :D

 

:lolpoof: TRUTH! :D

[MsMarvel73]

A twit?   LOL

I guess the Union had quite a few twits, did they not?

The names escape me (been too long since I've read about them), but I know they pulled quite a number of blunders.

 

Yes took Lincoln a while to find good generals. Pope at Second Manassas. Burnside at Fredericksburg. Hooker at Chancelorsville started really well but ended as badly as the rest. *shudder*

[YYZ66]

Yes took Lincoln a while to find good generals. Pope at Second Manassas. Burnside at Fredericksburg. Hooker at Chancelorsville started really well but ended as badly as the rest. *shudder*

 

Absolutely.  It could be a called a "comedy of errors", except that these morons cost the lives of how many thousands of men?

[display name]

But make sure you have a vehicle on both sides or you will have to walk the mile back across the field...and depending on what time of year you're there, that could be a rather nasty decision (packlotsofwater).

I did both miles, and it wasn't that bad. I didn't have any wool, have to carry a big gun, or have Hancock's foot soldiers and Artillery trying to kill me.

Not bad at all.

 

Absolutely.  It could be a called a "comedy of errors", except that these morons cost the lives of how many thousands of men?

I honestly think that McClellan was cheering for a rebel victory at the 2nd Bull Run. In my opinion, he and Hooker would probably have been the most obnoxious. "If General McClellan does not intend to use his army, my I borrow it?" Lincoln once asked.

Burnside did not want to accept the position of commander in-chief, which leads me to believe that he knew his capabilities. However, a general who lacks confidence will fail. I also do not believe that General Halleck should have done anything other than organizing, his strength.

[flaccopoe]

McClellan was such a detriment to the Union, it's not even funny.

[JEEPercreepermd]

A complete tactical blunder. March your men across an open field into a wall of cannon? Not very smart. I really think the heat, along with the nasty humidity of southcentral PA, took its toll on Lee. Up to Gettysburg, Lee had been pretty much tactically brilliant. Longstreet practically begged Lee not to charge and fight defensively. How much different might the country be if Lee had listened to Longstreet?

Yeah, revisionalist history paints that charge as a complete suicide mission. At the time, Lee had attacked both the extreme right and left ends of the Union line. He expected the Union to reinforce there, General Meade basically called his bluff and said that Lee will attack the center so that's where he massed. They say that the Confederates couldn't actually see the full mass of Union troops over the ridge that were awaiting them.
Blunder #2 was that the opening bombardment of Confederate artillery (about 120 guns?) had absolutely zero effect as they were overshooting the Union line.

Blunder # 3 was that the Confederate cavalry led by Stewart was supposed to flank the Union line and hit them from the rear at the same spot that Picketts charge was aimed at, splitting the union line in half and cutting them off. Stewarts cavalry was intercepted and defeated by Gen. Custer.

If all 3 of those things happen, maybe Lee would have had a better chance, still though it would have been tough.
Lee knew that a prolonged campaign was only giving the Union more time to keep re-organizing and time to find the right commander to lead the Army of the Potomac, while the Confederates manpower, supplies, and funding were all running dry. He was hell bent on a decisive and crushing victory on Union land.

[MsMarvel73]

Walking Pickett's Charge is one of the best things you can do.

Indeed although the terrain of Pickett's Charge field was altered in the early 20th century. A lot of the deep swales the Confederates wrote about were flattened for the Camp Colt tank training field during WWI (Camp Colt is the reason Eisenhower spent time in the Gettysburg area).

[display name]

Indeed although the terrain of Pickett's Charge field was altered in the early 20th century. A lot of the deep swales the Confederates wrote about were flattened for the Camp Colt tank training field during WWI (Camp Colt is the reason Eisenhower spent time in the Gettysburg area).

If true that's a shame.

[Fred Sanford]

Yeah, revisionalist history paints that charge as a complete suicide mission.

And it was, vs. any sort of reasonably resolute opponent.  Lee and the whole Army of Northern Virginia's problem was they got all puffed up against hopelessly overmatched commanders.  Meade was no Eugene of Savoy, but he delegated enough that his corps commanders and army who were tired of losing were able to keep interior lines of communication on excellent ground with numerical superiority well enough to hold.  Despite Sickles's stupid gambit and Howard's corps falling to pieces yet again, Doubleday, Reynolds before his unfortunate death and Hancock, with an assist from Gouverneur K. Warren, with Slocum and the rest doing their thing, were able to fight a solid defense, and that's all that was necessary.  Lee knew Hill's corps had no business beginning a fight as a long column forced marching toward a skirmish with the rest of his army scattered.  He knew he had no Stonewall, he knew Culp's and Cemetery Hills were firmly defended after the possibly missed opportunity on day one.  He knew Evander Law was pushed back on day two.  Any threat the Army of the Potomac might have felt on day three from the flank attacks had to be lessened knowing they had just fought off similar attempts the day before.  The outer lines of communication meant the attacks were once again, like the Union at Antietam, way too staggered to prevent reinforcement at the point of attack.  The cavalry charge would work fine if it was the Battle of Bouvines, but would be massacred unless absolutely perfectly timed, which was impossible.  He had little reason to think Pleasanton had much of a shot against Stuart, although the Union cavalry held its own for the first time in the Shenandoah just before Gettysburg.

 

The real problems were of course the Union did have time to reinforce the center, and certainly did so because the huge artillery barrage was ineffective and announced Lee's intentions.  Without spotters, without knowledge the Union was actually rather than theoretically weak in the center, zero knowledge of what became of the cavalry attack, knowing his army was tired and Meade had at least not pulled a Burnside or Hooker with an F- performance, Hancock the Superb was the focus of his attack, and his men would be charging defensive entrenchments uphill, and the element of surprise was unlikely, Lee can not order that attack in those conditions as a brilliant military man, but he did anyway.  He made his career as a riverboat gambler, but a guy has to know when to fold and play another hand.  He well knew this, but Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville blew up that army's esprit de corps so big that the charge seemed reasonable.  That disdain for the Army of the Potomac led to obliquing right into enfilade grapeshot fire and condemned the South to the defensive thereafter.  Lee was a great general, but disrespecting your opponent (right after losing Jackson) will lead you right into your own Crécy.  The South hated Longstreet forevermore because he said what nobody wanted to hear, and he was right.  Armistead made shocking progress actually, but "a spent arrow can not pierce silk."

[MsMarvel73]

If true that's a shame.

 

 

It is true. The swales in the field ARE still pretty impressive, but not quite as impressive as they had been at actual battle time.

[JEEPercreepermd]

Yeah, revisionalist history paints that charge as a complete suicide mission.
And it was, vs. any sort of reasonably resolute opponent. Lee and the whole Army of Northern Virginia's problem was they got all puffed up against hopelessly overmatched commanders. Meade was no Eugene of Savoy, but he delegated enough that his corps commanders and army who were tired of losing were able to keep interior lines of communication on excellent ground with numerical superiority well enough to hold. Despite Sickles's stupid gambit and Howard's corps falling to pieces yet again, Doubleday, Reynolds before his unfortunate death and Hancock, with an assist from Gouverneur K. Warren, with Slocum and the rest doing their thing, were able to fight a solid defense, and that's all that was necessary. Lee knew Hill's corps had no business beginning a fight as a long column forced marching toward a skirmish with the rest of his army scattered. He knew he had no Stonewall, he knew Culp's and Cemetery Hills were firmly defended after the possibly missed opportunity on day one. He knew Evander Law was pushed back on day two. Any threat the Army of the Potomac might have felt on day three from the flank attacks had to be lessened knowing they had just fought off similar attempts the day before. The outer lines of communication meant the attacks were once again, like the Union at Antietam, way too staggered to prevent reinforcement at the point of attack. The cavalry charge would work fine if it was the Battle of Bouvines, but would be massacred unless absolutely perfectly timed, which was impossible. He had little reason to think Pleasanton had much of a shot against Stuart, although the Union cavalry held its own for the first time in the Shenandoah just before Gettysburg.

The real problems were of course the Union did have time to reinforce the center, and certainly did so because the huge artillery barrage was ineffective and announced Lee's intentions. Without spotters, without knowledge the Union was actually rather than theoretically weak in the center, zero knowledge of what became of the cavalry attack, knowing his army was tired and Meade had at least not pulled a Burnside or Hooker with an F- performance, Hancock the Superb was the focus of his attack, and his men would be charging defensive entrenchments uphill, and the element of surprise was unlikely, Lee can not order that attack in those conditions as a brilliant military man, but he did anyway. He made his career as a riverboat gambler, but a guy has to know when to fold and play another hand. He well knew this, but Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville blew up that army's esprit de corps so big that the charge seemed reasonable. That disdain for the Army of the Potomac led to obliquing right into enfilade grapeshot fire and condemned the South to the defensive thereafter. Lee was a great general, but disrespecting your opponent (right after losing Jackson) will lead you right into your own Crécy. The South hated Longstreet forevermore because he said what nobody wanted to hear, and he was right. Armistead made shocking progress actually, but "a spent arrow can not pierce silk."

I'm glad that you mentioned "Gen." Sickles. I make quotations around his rank, because he basically bought his rank.
He wanted all of the glory for himself, yet his inexplicably ill advised move to pull his corps off of the high ground, and spread them out before 14,000 confederates under Longstreet almost lost the battle, and quite possibly the war.

I once heard that one of Mead's advisors arrived at Sickles' original position and found nothing but signalers. Luckily, as you said the communication was good enough that they were able to pull troops in to reinforce that position.

Question. Was Col. Chamberlain's infamous 20th Maine part of that reinforcement? Or were they originally positioned on the extreme left?

[YYZ66]

I'm glad that you mentioned "Gen." Sickles. I make quotations around his rank, because he basically bought his rank.
He wanted all of the glory for himself, yet his inexplicably ill advised move to pull his corps off of the high ground, and spread them out before 14,000 confederates under Longstreet almost lost the battle, and quite possibly the war.

I once heard that one of Mead's advisors arrived at Sickles' original position and found nothing but signalers. Luckily, as you said the communication was good enough that they were able to pull troops in to reinforce that position.

Question. Was Col. Chamberlain's infamous 20th Maine part of that reinforcement? Or were they originally positioned on the extreme left?

 

I had forgotten about that clueless bozo Sickles.  Didn't he go back to Washington and face a hearing where he painted himself a war hero?  

 

I think Chamberlain was originally positioned there, but could be wrong.

I bet Chute would know the answer to this question.   :)

[MsMarvel73]

I had forgotten about that clueless bozo Sickles.  Didn't he go back to Washington and face a hearing where he painted himself a war hero?  

 

I think Chamberlain was originally positioned there, but could be wrong.

I bet Chute would know the answer to this question.   :)

Sickles got himself a Medal of Honor for his "courageous actions" at Gettysburg!!!! But to give Sickles a very slight benefit of the doubt, he had gotten seriously spooked because of what had happened to his Corps at Chancellorsville...they had been down on the low ground there and had gotten run over, basically. He saw the ground on the Union left at Gettysburg and just thought the same thing would happen. Of course that was no reason for him to disobey direct orders...but that was Sickles. And, during my internship summer, I happened to get to LRT one morning at the same time as a Marine Corps staff ride from Quantico. Fascinating stuff that was hearing all those Marine officers agree that "Sickles' line forward was a great place from which to launch an attack but a totally *censored* one from which to defend."

 

As much as I intensely dislike Sickles, I do have to give him credit for one thing....he was the prime architect behind the legislation that created the Gettysburg battlefield park and started the Gettysburg battlefield preservation. NY Senator Sickles, if memory serves me correctly.

 

And no Vincent's brigade (20th Maine, 44th New York, 16th Michigan and 83rd Pennsylvania) was not orginally supposed to be on the extreme left. They were heading toward the Wheatfield when they were intercepted. Col. Vincent took it upon himself to break orders and move his brigade to that extreme left position. He probably would have been court-martialed had things gone badly on the left.

 

There ya go, Doc. Challenge accepted and thrown down. :D

[display name]

I'm glad that you mentioned "Gen." Sickles. I make quotations around his rank, because he basically bought his rank.
He wanted all of the glory for himself, yet his inexplicably ill advised move to pull his corps off of the high ground, and spread them out before 14,000 confederates under Longstreet almost lost the battle, and quite possibly the war.

I once heard that one of Mead's advisors arrived at Sickles' original position and found nothing but signalers. Luckily, as you said the communication was good enough that they were able to pull troops in to reinforce that position.

Question. Was Col. Chamberlain's infamous 20th Maine part of that reinforcement? Or were they originally positioned on the extreme left?

 

 

I had forgotten about that clueless bozo Sickles.  Didn't he go back to Washington and face a hearing where he painted himself a war hero?  

 

I think Chamberlain was originally positioned there, but could be wrong.

I bet Chute would know the answer to this question.   :)

 

 

Sickles got himself a Medal of Honor for his "courageous actions" at Gettysburg!!!! But to give Sickles a very slight benefit of the doubt, he had gotten seriously spooked because of what had happened to his Corps at Chancellorsville...they had been down on the low ground there and had gotten run over, basically. He saw the ground on the Union left at Gettysburg and just thought the same thing would happen. Of course that was no reason for him to disobey direct orders...but that was Sickles. And, during my internship summer, I happened to get to LRT one morning at the same time as a Marine Corps staff ride from Quantico. Fascinating stuff that was hearing all those Marine officers agree that "Sickles' line forward was a great place from which to launch an attack but a totally *censored* one from which to defend."

 

As much as I intensely dislike Sickles, I do have to give him credit for one thing....he was the prime architect behind the legislation that created the Gettysburg battlefield park and started the Gettysburg battlefield preservation. NY Senator Sickles, if memory serves me correctly.

 

And no Vincent's brigade (20th Maine, 44th New York, 16th Michigan and 83rd Pennsylvania) was not orginally supposed to be on the extreme left. They were heading toward the Wheatfield when they were intercepted. Col. Vincent took it upon himself to break orders and move his brigade to that extreme left position. He probably would have been court-martialed had things gone badly on the left.

 

There ya go, Doc. Challenge accepted and thrown down. :D

At the last moment, General G. Warren recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and placed the 20th Maine and three other regiments there. The hill was on the extreme left, protecting the flank.

[YYZ66]

Sickles got himself a Medal of Honor for his "courageous actions" at Gettysburg!!!! But to give Sickles a very slight benefit of the doubt, he had gotten seriously spooked because of what had happened to his Corps at Chancellorsville...they had been down on the low ground there and had gotten run over, basically. He saw the ground on the Union left at Gettysburg and just thought the same thing would happen. Of course that was no reason for him to disobey direct orders...but that was Sickles. And, during my internship summer, I happened to get to LRT one morning at the same time as a Marine Corps staff ride from Quantico. Fascinating stuff that was hearing all those Marine officers agree that "Sickles' line forward was a great place from which to launch an attack but a totally *censored* one from which to defend."

 

As much as I intensely dislike Sickles, I do have to give him credit for one thing....he was the prime architect behind the legislation that created the Gettysburg battlefield park and started the Gettysburg battlefield preservation. NY Senator Sickles, if memory serves me correctly.

 

And no Vincent's brigade (20th Maine, 44th New York, 16th Michigan and 83rd Pennsylvania) was not orginally supposed to be on the extreme left. They were heading toward the Wheatfield when they were intercepted. Col. Vincent took it upon himself to break orders and move his brigade to that extreme left position. He probably would have been court-martialed had things gone badly on the left.

 

There ya go, Doc. Challenge accepted and thrown down. :D

 

I figured if anyone knew, it'd be you.  Well done!   :)

[BMORElegacy]

WOAH. How did I just find this? I love military history and especially the Civil War. 

[flaccopoe]

Thought I'd share this:

 

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/slavery/experience/legal/feature.html

[display name]

I think the biggest unsung hero of the war may be Winfield Scott, "Old Fuss and Feathers." He originally came up with an "Anaconda Plan" to slowly squeeze the life out of the South. This was a strategy that the Union actually used, but Scott is seldom credited for it.

[display name]

Scott would probably have served for a little while longer had McClellan not called for his removal so that he could become general-in chief.

[Moderator 2]

We are meeting friends and touring the battlefield next week BEFORE everyone is there for the anniversary of the Gettysburg Address, 150 years.